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SHELLS  OF  THE  STORES  THEY  ONCE  WERE:
RETURNING  VACANT  RETAIL  PROPERTY  TO
PRODUCTIVE  USE  IN  THE  MIDST  OF
THE “RETAIL APOCALYPSE”
Mairead J. Fitzgerald-Mumford*
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
In the first quarter of 2017, nine major retailers—as many as in all of
2016—declared bankruptcy, sparking widespread concern that America was
in the midst of a “retail apocalypse.”1  The United States has been overstored
for decades,2 but the issue reached a tipping point last year, when retail
chains announced almost 7000 store closings.3  The trend continued in 2018,
with over 3800 store closures announced in the first quarter alone.4
Although there may be uncertainty surrounding what the future of the retail
industry will look like, one thing is clear: the communities from which retail-
ers are departing will bear the burden of the shells that have been left
behind.
A. The Greyfield Problem
The vacant retail properties that are the central focus of this Note
include former malls, strip malls, anchor stores, and “big box stores.”5  These
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2020; Master of Education,
University of Notre Dame, 2016; Bachelor of Arts in Medieval Studies and Irish Language
and Literature, University of Notre Dame, 2014.  I would like to thank Professor Jim Kelly
for his guidance and expertise, the staff of the Notre Dame Law Review for their diligent
editing and encouragement, and my family for their endless love and support.  All errors
are my own.
1 Derek Thompson, What in the World Is Causing the Retail Meltdown of 2017?, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/04/retail-melt
down-of-2017/522384/.
2 See id.
3 Matt Townsend et al., America’s ‘Retail Apocalypse’ Is Really Just Beginning, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-retail-debt/.
4 Hayley Peterson, More than 3,800 Stores Will Close in 2018—Here’s the Full List, BUS.
INSIDER (Apr. 7, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/stores-closing-in-2018-2017-12
(listing store closures announced as of April 7, 2018).
5 See, e.g., Sarah Schindler, The Future of Abandoned Big Box Stores: Legal Solutions to the
Legacies of Poor Planning Decisions, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 471, 474 n.5 (2012) (explaining that
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empty structures go by many names: “ghostboxes,”6 “greyfields,”7 retail
“shells,”8 and “dark stores,”9 to name a few.  The reasons for these vacancies
are myriad, but not mysterious: retail chains regularly make the decision to
close underperforming store locations;10 companies go bankrupt;11 or—
most infuriatingly for many residents—companies leave a perfectly fine store
empty and, like a hermit crab, move into another slightly larger store just
down the road.12  The structures often remain empty for years, and they are
hard to miss.13  They were “gut-wrenchingly ugly”14 to begin with, and the
faded outlines of neon signs and empty parking lots littered with plastic-bag
tumbleweed quickly turn ghostboxes into depressing eyesores.
Appearance aside, these vacant stores pose serious problems for the pub-
lic’s health, safety, and welfare.  They are magnets for crime, particularly
arson, theft, drug crimes, and vandalism.15  Although there is an argument
that the distance between such stores and suburban and rural residential
areas mitigates the danger to neighbors, the fact remains that ghostboxes
there is no precise definition for big box stores, but that the typical model is a single-story
building of 20,000–300,000 square feet, which can be a stand-alone store or may be located
in a strip mall or shopping center).
6 See, e.g., Jessica LeVeen Farr, The Ghost-Box Dilemma: Communities Cope with Vacant
Retail Property, PARTNERS COMMUNITY & ECON. DEV., Fall 2005.
7 See, e.g., Schindler, supra note 5, at 484–85.
8 See, e.g., id. at 481.
9 See, e.g., INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE, BIG-BOX BLIGHT: THE SPREAD OF DARK
STORES (2007), https://ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/bbtk-factsheet-blight.pdf.
10 See LEE HOLMAN & GREG BUZEK, DEBUNKING THE RETAIL APOCALYPSE 7 (2017).
11 See Townsend et al., supra note 3.
12 See, e.g., Christopher Peak, When Walmart Leaves, MEDIUM (Jan. 12, 2015), https://
medium.com/@peak/the-ghost-stores-of-walmart-47f918f99f9d.
13 INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE, supra note 9.
14 Dwight H. Merriam, Breaking Big Boxes: Learning from the Horse Whisperers, 6 VT. J.
ENVTL. L. 7, 17 (2005).
15 See, e.g., Police Find Meth Evidence in Vacant Store Where Dead Woman Discovered, NEWS-
SENTINEL (Fort Wayne, Indiana), Jan. 25, 2013 (squatting, manufacturing
methamphetamine); Tom Y. Chang & Mireille Jacobson, Research: When a Retail Store Closes,
Crime Increases Around It, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 29, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/06/
research-when-a-retail-store-closes-crime-increases-around-it (discussing increase in crime
in area surrounding closed retail businesses and attributing it, at least in part, to decrease
in foot traffic and informal surveillance); Stephanie Farr, Cops: Squatter at 69th St. Payless
Started Fire, PHILA. INQUIRER (July 9, 2015), http://www2.philly.com/philly/blogs/delco/
Cops-Squatter-at-69th-St-Payless-started-fire.html (squatting, theft, fire); Ashley Lutz &
Mary Hanbury, Haunting Photos of an Ohio Mall That Became a Hotbed of Crime Before It Was
Demolished, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/deserted-mall-
now-covered-in-snow-2015-2 (squatting, theft, suspected murder); Brian McCready, Vacant
Milford Store Called ‘Unsafe,’ NEW HAVEN REG. (July 13, 2011), https://www.nhregister.com/
news/article/Vacant-Milford-store-called-unsafe-11561550.php (explaining broken win-
dows pose threat to public health and safety); Police Say Felon Living in Vacant Orland Park
Store Had Guns, Ammo—and a Bobcat, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.chicago-
tribune.com/suburbs/daily-southtown/crime/ct-sta-orland-search-warrant-st-0302-2018
0301-story.html (squatting).
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make communities less safe and put a burden on municipal services.  After a
retail shell is vacated, municipalities must often spend “additional public
money” for “greater police service to monitor the property, greater fire ser-
vices due to the likelihood of fires in abandoned structures, and the provi-
sion of cosmetic improvements meant to make the property look
occupied.”16  Indeed, retail shells “disproportionately affect these public
safety costs” compared to vacant residential properties.17  One study of
vacant and abandoned properties revealed that “[a]lthough commercial
properties make up only 3 percent of Oklahoma City’s vacancies, they
account for approximately 40 percent of all police and fire calls.”18
The greatest threat that ghostboxes pose to communities is economic in
nature.  Municipalities compete to attract businesses, often investing millions
of taxpayer dollars in constructing infrastructure and providing subsidies and
tax breaks.19  When major retailers exit so-called “anchor stores” that support
smaller businesses in malls, strip malls, and shopping centers, the decrease in
foot traffic harms smaller businesses.20  The longer these stores remain
vacant—and it usually is a long vacancy, since it is notoriously difficult to find
new ghostbox occupants21—the greater the chance that an entire retail plaza
will go dark.22  Communities have long recognized that even standalone
retail shells can cause devastating economic disinvestment in the area.  As a
spokeswoman for one Pennsylvania township, which spent in excess of eight
million dollars to purchase a former Bon-Ton department store, said: “The
site is highly visible . . . and a long-term vacancy could have a detrimental
effect on [the township’s] economic image and tax base.”23
B. Scope
This Note intends to address responses to retail vacancies by local gov-
ernments in nonurban areas where land is relatively cheap and low-density
development predominates.  Its purpose is to assist these municipalities in
motivating owners of vacant retail structures to return the property to pro-
ductive use, thereby significantly reducing the number of empty retail shells
that litter the landscapes of many communities.  Alternatively, in cases where
the owner is unable or unwilling to mitigate the negative externalities
imposed on the community by a vacant retail structure, I propose solutions
16 Schindler, supra note 5, at 496.
17 U.S. Dep’t Hous. & Urban Dev., Vacant and Abandoned Properties: Turning Liabilities
into Assets, EVIDENCE MATTERS, Winter 2014, at 1, 7.
18 Id. at 7.
19 Schindler, supra note 5, at 494; see Peak, supra note 12.
20 Schindler, supra note 5, at 494; see Peak, supra note 12.
21 See infra Section II.B.
22 Peak, supra note 12.
23 Jason Scott, Local Authority Closing In on $8.1M Deal for Former Bon-Ton Store, CENT.
PENN BUS. J. (Sept. 20, 2018), http://www.cpbj.com/article/20180920/CPBJ01/
180929999/local-authority-closing-in-on-81m-deal-for-former-bonton-store (quoting Erin
Trone, assistant township manager for Lower Allen Township, Pennsylvania).
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tailored to commercial properties24 that will allow local governments to inter-
vene in ways that will have the least amount of impact on strained municipal
budgets.
My intention is to suggest a typology for categorizing retail property
vacancies and to identify a few methods that local governments may employ
to reduce the length of time during which such properties remain vacant.  In
proposing that local governments begin the analysis of vacant building situa-
tions with a determination of the highest and best use of the property, my
aim is to provide a use-neutral framework, not to promote certain land uses
over others.25  Furthermore, this Note encourages communities not to over-
24 An extensive body of work has been done to solve the related but distinct issue of
abandoned residential property in urban areas. See generally James J. Kelly, Jr., Refreshing the
Heart of the City: Vacant Building Receivership as a Tool for Neighborhood Revitalization and Com-
munity Empowerment, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 210 (2004) [herein-
after Kelly, Refreshing the Heart]; Julie A. Tappendorf & Brent O. Denzin, Turning Vacant
Properties into Community Assets Through Land Banking, 43 URB. LAW. 801 (2011); Kory T.
Bell, Note, One Nail at a Time: Building Deconstruction Law as a Tool to Demolish Abandoned
Housing Problems, 45 IND. L. REV. 547 (2012).
Urban communities are characterized by higher demand for developable land than
available land, and abandoned property solutions focus on freeing up underutilized prop-
erty for redevelopment.  U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., supra note 17, at 9–11.  Subur-
ban and rural communities, on the other hand, suffer from lack of demand: cheap land
makes it more likely that newcomers will build fresh rather than redevelop. See, e.g., Ann
Eisenberg, Addressing Rural Blight: Lessons from West Virginia and WV LEAP, 24 J. AFFORDABLE
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 513, 518 (2016) (“[L]ow population numbers inhibit
[rural] communities’ ability to achieve economies of scale, limited local economies keep
new businesses and job seekers away, and both issues make it more difficult to put a prob-
lem property to productive reuse.”).
Furthermore, owners of abandoned commercial property are not amenable to the
same approaches as owners of abandoned residential property.  The latter are frequently
difficult to locate, unsophisticated, and judgment proof. See James J. Kelly, Jr., A Contin-
uum in Remedies: Reconnecting Vacant Houses to the Market, 33 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 109,
120 (2013) [hereinafter Kelly, A Continuum in Remedies].  The residences are often in a
state of severe disrepair due to the owner’s unwillingness or inability to invest in upkeep.
Even when the state of disrepair is not so severe as to constitute blight, urban properties
are more amenable to nuisance-based remedies: “Small lot sizes mean that city dwellers are
more sensitive to the uses, and abuses, that occur on neighboring properties.” Id. at 119.
The retail owners, on the other hand, are generally large corporations, easily identified
and, even if bankrupt, rarely let the buildings fall into such disrepair that they would
become subject to liability for nuisance and code violations.
25 For several years, there has been a strong push by some against big box stores’ entry
into new communities.  If a municipality wishes to reduce the number of large retail chains
in the community, there is a significant body of research on the topic. See generally Sympo-
sium, Small Town America in the Era of Big Box Development, 6 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 6 (2005).  A big
box retailer, however, is not always an evil to be cast out.  This is especially true in commu-
nities that depend on big boxes to provide access to a wide range of goods and services.
For ex ante approaches that communities can use to prevent ghostboxes, see Schindler,
supra note 5, at 499–501; Betsy H. Sochar, Comment, Shining the Light on Greyfields: A Wal-
Mart Case Study on Preventing Abandonment of Big Box Stores Through Land Use Regulations, 71
ALB. L. REV. 697 (2008).
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look temporary or unconventional uses for spaces, such as pop-up stores or
seasonal stores, which can provide relief even when the prospects of full reoc-
cupation are bleak.  In the words of Professor Schindler: “Nearly any use
would be more economically beneficial to a municipality and its residents
than an abandoned property.”26  Every community is different, and this Note
encourages local governments to tailor any method to the unique present
and future needs of the communities that they serve.
The menu of potential remedies contained herein is by no means
exhaustive.  As the voluminous body of literature regarding abandoned
urban and residential properties suggests, there is ample room for creativity
in this area of the law.27  Furthermore, the range of solutions available
depends on the specifics of the interaction between state and local law.28
The options that this Note recommends intentionally represent the path of
least resistance—conservative approaches that can be deployed by the shrink-
ing or underresourced municipalities, which struggle most severely with
abandoned retail real estate issues.  The methods geared toward these com-
munities are well established, relatively low cost, and unlikely to invite litiga-
tion by corporations who have far greater resources than most municipalities
can dedicate to a protracted legal battle.  Communities with more resources
to dedicate to eliminating vacant retail property are encouraged to use this
limited menu as a jumping-off point to pioneer innovative solutions and to
use the full reach of local power available to them.
II. ANALYSIS AND SOLUTIONS
A. Analytical Framework: A Postabandonment Approach
As already established, retail property owners’ failure to put their
properties to productive use imposes negative externalities and costs on the
surrounding community.29  Once a retailer has vacated a store, the goal
should be to minimize the amount of time that the structure remains unoc-
cupied and unproductive.
The solutions proposed in much of the existing vacant-property litera-
ture cannot be adopted wholesale into a suburban or rural context.30  In
major cities, demand for property is high, and land is a scarce commodity.31
In those communities, land use planning is focused on channeling develop-
ment.  Outside of urban centers, however, the opposite problem exists:
26 Schindler, supra note 5, at 524.
27 See supra note 24.
28 See, e.g., Kelly, A Continuum in Remedies, supra note 24, at 132 (noting that “a rela-
tively unique provision in Maryland’s home rule provisions” allowed the city of Baltimore
to create a super-priority receiver’s lien on vacant properties, but that “[c]reating new
super-priority liens and foreclosure proceedings would be beyond the scope of most local
governments’ home rule authority”).
29 See supra Section I.A.
30 See supra Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 515–16; Section I.B.
31 See U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., supra note 17, at 9–11.
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municipalities with sprawling, undeveloped land engage in cutthroat compe-
tition to attract development and the economic opportunities that come with
it.32
Local governments, particularly those in suburban and rural areas, are
frequently underresourced as it is.  The best solution in these communities is
the one that requires the least amount of investment by the municipality.
Rather than taking on the expensive, time- and resource-consuming task of
identifying and bringing in a new occupant—what I refer to as a proactive
approach—local governments should allow the market to do the heavy lifting
whenever possible.  In most cases, this does not mean that local governments
should take a passive approach, sitting by and waiting for the problem to
work itself out—the ubiquity of greyfields speaks loudly to the inefficacy of
such tactics.  Instead, municipalities must take what I call a market-anticipatory
approach: they must first identify the path of least resistance by which a new
tenant will take over the structure, and then take steps to remove barriers
that would slow down or prevent such a transaction.
The first step in the market-anticipatory approach is to determine the
marketability of the building in question by identifying the highest-value use
of the property33 and then assessing the suitability of the existing structure to
that use.  This step is diagnostic rather than prescriptive: the highest-value
use is highly contextual and will depend largely on the likely economic
return on a particular use of the parcel, offset by negative externalities34
imposed on the community by that use.  In some cases, the highest-value use
will match the existing use: retail.35  In other cases, it may be nonretail com-
mercial development (e.g., incubator spaces, offices, or warehouses).36  In
severe cases, the highest-value use will not be commercial.  Shrinking munici-
palities often do not have the demand for goods, services, or housing to sup-
32 See JENNIFER EVANS-COWLEY, MEETING THE BIG-BOX CHALLENGE 55 (2006) (noting
that communities often engage in intense competition with one another to attract big box
stores in the first place).
33 See generally Katherine Bryan Tanucci, Highest and Best Use, 42 APPRAISAL J. 518
(1974) (discussing factors for use by real estate appraisers in determining highest and best
use of property).
34 “Negative externalities,” for this analysis, must be interpreted through a narrow
lens.  To be included in the highest-value use consideration, a negative externality must
outweigh the burden of allowing the property to remain vacant.
35 Including pop-up or seasonal stores, which are “stores that are open for only a short
time, usually a few months” and are used to “create excitement for a brand, take advantage
of a busy season like Christmastime, or test a store concept.”  Richard Kestenbaum, This Is
What Will Happen to All the Empty Stores You’re Seeing, FORBES (May 30, 2017), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/richardkestenbaum/2017/05/30/this-is-what-will-happen-to-all-the-
empty-stores-youre-seeing/#e0850b74bb78.
36 See, e.g., MARIA SICOLA & MARK STAPP, INT’L COUNCIL OF SHOPPING CTRS., TRANS-
FORMING CLASS B AND C RETAIL CENTERS: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2018), https://www.icsc.org/
uploads/t07-subpage/Transforming_Class_BC_Centers.pdf (“[T]he challenges [of reno-
vating and retenanting] become not only what retailers want for store formats but also
what other types of uses—medical, education, entertainment—may make the most sense
going forward.”).
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port commercial use of all previously developed land.37  Population
changes—particularly in aging rural communities38—may call for different
use distributions than were previously planned, or unanticipated settlement
patterns may have cut the property off from high-traffic areas.  The use may
not have been suited to the location in the first place.39
Whatever the highest-value use of the land may be, municipalities must
then make an objective determination of the suitability of the structure, as it
now stands, to that use.  A structure well suited to the highest-value use is one
that requires only minor or cosmetic changes, such as switching out signs and
changing floor covering and paint to match the new tenant’s branding, in
order to fulfill that use.  An existing structure that is moderately suited to its
highest-value use will require major renovations in order to fit that use, but
the renovations will not exceed the cost of new construction on undeveloped
land.  Although some have raised concerns that the low cost of land in
nonurban areas will frequently result in the cost of renovation exceeding the
cost of new construction,40 it is appropriate here to factor in the costs that
will be saved due to the preexisting infrastructure.41  Even if a new developer
would not bear the entire cost of constructing roads, the time saved by not
having to wait for permitting and construction, as well as preestablished pat-
terns of consumer behavior—citizens, after all, already are accustomed to
37 See, e.g., KIM PARKER ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., WHAT UNITES AND DIVIDES URBAN,
SUBURBAN AND RURAL COMMUNITIES 16 (2018), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/05/
22/what-unites-and-divides-urban-suburban-and-rural-communities/ (discussing popula-
tion loss in rural communities); John Cromartie, Rural Areas Show Overall Population Decline
and Shifting Regional Patterns of Population Change, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.: ECON. RES. SERV. (Sept.
5, 2017), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2017/september/rural-areas-show-over-
all-population-decline-and-shifting-regional-patterns-of-population-change/; Frank Morris,
As Rural Towns Lose Population, They Can Learn to “Shrink Smart,” NPR (June 19, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/06/19/618848050/as-rural-towns-lose-population-they-can-
learn-to-shrink-smart. But see Tim Henderson, Rural Counties Are Making a Comeback, Census
Data Shows, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-
and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/03/22/rural-counties-are-making-a-comeback-census-
data-shows (reporting that “[r]ural areas . . . gained population between 2016 and 2017 for
the first time since 2010,” but noting that the increase is due in significant part to increase
in populations of more populous rural counties).
38 PARKER ET AL., supra note 37, at 22.
39 See J.L. Cherwin Jr. & Virginia M. Harding, New Tenants for Big Boxes, PROB. & PROP.,
Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 37, 38 (“Communities most likely to consider proposals for nonretail
reuses of their vacant big boxes are rural areas, particularly those that have lost crucial area
employers and need an impetus for more jobs; distant suburbs that experienced substan-
tial growth in large scale big-box retail development in anticipation of new residential
developments that are now stalled or abandoned; and declining suburbs and urban
areas.”); see also Cromartie, supra note 37; John Cromartie & Timothy Parker, What Is
Rural?, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.: ECON. RES. SERV., https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/rural-econ-
omy-population/rural-classifications/what-is-rural/ (last updated July 12, 2018).
40 Cherwin & Harding, supra note 39, at 40.
41 See Farr, supra note 6 (“It is . . . easier to re-lease a store located in a prime location
with good parking, infrastructure, and road access, and in close proximity to other success-
ful retailers.”).
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traveling to the now-vacant store—weigh in favor of renovating an existing
structure.  Finally, some structures will be unsuitable for the highest-value use,
particularly in the case of buildings that were poorly constructed from the
outset or have become blighted.42  The cost of renovating these structures
exceeds the cost of developing a greenfield, and they will need to be demol-
ished and the site redeveloped before it can be profitably used.43  It is impor-
tant to note that cases may be on the border between classifications, or may
change from one category to another over time.  This is not problematic: the
solutions recommended for each classification are flexible and nonexclusive.
Based on the identified highest and best use of the property and the
suitability of the existing structure, governments can assess a store’s marketa-
bility.  The matrix below shows what transaction will naturally result from
each of the possible permutations if transaction costs are zero and if the par-
ties know the fair market value of their property and negotiate rationally.  Of
course, this does not reflect reality, and one might question why a local gov-
ernment would waste its time with a purely theoretical model.  Although it is
true that real-world transactions are almost never frictionless, considering the
outcome that would occur in such a market is a useful exercise because it
shows the extent—and limits—of what the market can do to return the prop-
erty to productive use.
42 See Eleanor Cummins, Big Box Stores Are Dying. What Do We Do with All the Bodies?,
POPULAR SCI. (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.popsci.com/repurposing-big-box-stores#page-
2/ (“A lot of these big box structures were very cheaply built. . . . Their lifespan was not
really meant to be more than 25 or 30 years . . . .”).
43 This is especially true for older buildings constructed using materials now known to
be toxic.  Renovation in those cases would be extremely expensive. See, e.g., Dan
D’Ambrosio, Burlington Mall Demolition Delayed Two Months for Asbestos Removal, BURLINGTON
FREE PRESS (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/story/news/2018/04/
26/burlington-mall-demolition-delayed-two-months-asbestos-removal/554227002/; Nick
Kotsopoulos, Union Station Repair Costs Grow by $1.5M; Asbestos Left Behind During Previous
Renovation, TELEGRAM (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.telegram.com/news/20181018/union-
station-repair-costs-grow-by-15m-asbestos-left-behind-during-previous-renovation.
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TABLE 1:  HIGHEST-VALUE USE

















Well Suited Reuse Adaptive Reuse Adaptive Reuse 
Moderately  
Suited 
Renovation and  
Reuse Adaptive Reuse Adaptive Reuse 
Unsuitable No Transaction No Transaction No Transaction 
From this matrix, certain patterns emerge.  One can see that if a build-
ing is well suited or moderately suited for the highest-value use of the land on
which it is situated, then the owner will be able to sell or lease it to a produc-
tive user so long as there are no intervening obstacles (e.g., zoning restric-
tions, lease clauses prohibiting commercial tenants, holdouts) hindering the
transaction.  In these situations, the controversial and expensive direct gov-
ernment intervention will be unnecessary if the municipality focuses on
removing barriers that would prevent effective negotiation.
The matrix also makes clear that if a structure is unsuitable for its high-
est-value use, no transaction will occur.  This is especially problematic in sub-
urban and rural areas because undeveloped land—the starting point most
developers expect—is so plentiful and so accessible to vehicle-reliant con-
sumers that it is practically fungible.44  No developer in this situation will pay
to renovate an outdated store when a brand-new one that checks all the
boxes can be obtained at a lower cost.  These are the situations in which the
local government must intervene if it wishes to see the property put to a new,
productive use.
B. Removing Barriers to Transactions: Well-Suited and
Moderately Suited Structures
Even when a retail property is amenable to retail reuse or adaptive reuse,
the owner may fail to locate a new tenant within a reasonable amount of
time.  The reasons for long vacancies are varied and highly contextual.45  In
44 See Schindler, supra note 5, at 498.
45 Id. at 488 n.67 (“There are many possible explanations for the long
vacancies . . . .”).
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many cases, the vacating retailer owns the property and chooses not to rete-
nant it,46 or “the former retail tenant prefers to continue paying rent under
its lease to prevent competition from moving in.”47  In other cases, local gov-
ernments and property owners disagree about the property’s marketability:
One of the inevitabilities of retail real estate now is that it will be less valua-
ble in the future than it was in the past.  You don’t need a crystal ball to see
that there’s more supply than demand of retail square feet . . . . Landlords
are not acting quickly to recognize that, they are not acknowledging that
their asset is less valuable, they are not lowering the price of their space fast
enough . . . . They are letting the space sit on the market while their thinking
adjusts.48
The owner may be waiting—perhaps in vain—“to see if the area or econ-
omy improve to get more rent or a higher purchase offer.”49  The cost of
renovating the structure for immediate nonretail use may outweigh the
owner’s anticipated cost of waiting until a retail tenant can be found.50  Even
if the owner recognizes the wisdom of renovating and locating a nonretail
tenant, necessary funding and internal approvals for the project may simply
be unavailable.51  Luckily for local governments, the barrier to transacting is
occasionally within their control: “Zoning restrictions can make or break
projects and orchestrating changes in them can delay [the] timetable, adding
significant costs.”52
In order for a transaction to take place, a willing buyer (the tenant) and
a willing seller (the owner) must meet at the bargaining table.  This Section
focuses on ways in which local governments can attack both sides of the equa-
tion—reducing the incentive for owners to hold out for higher prices and
increasing the pool of prospective tenants—to create an environment that
encourages transactions.
46 This Note uses the word “retenanting” as a general term to include any productive
use of property by a new occupant, regardless of whether that occupation occurs through
lease or sale.
47 Schindler, supra note 5, at 488 n.67.
48 Kestenbaum, supra note 35.
49 Schindler, supra note 5, at 488 n.67; see also J. Brian Charles, Cities Now Use Taxes to
Fight Blight. Is It Working?, GOVERNING (May 14, 2018), http://www.governing.com/topics/
urban/gov-cities-blight-taxes-lc.html.
50 See Cherwin & Harding, supra note 39, at 40 (“Tenants have no incentive to incur
significant costs for capital improvements unless the owner is willing to enter into a long-
term lease (15 to 20 years); however, entering into a long-term lease with a nonretail ten-
ant hinders the owner’s ability to merely ‘park or bank’ the property for the short term.
The owner will be forced to decide whether to tie up the property with a nonretail user
generating a lower investment return for a long term, or to keep the property vacant,
waiting for the opportunity of receiving greater returns in the future from a new retail
tenant.”).
51 SICOLA & STAPP, supra note 36, at 3 (explaining that shopping “[c]enters that have
been foreclosed and managed by third-party asset managers often cannot make the
needed changes due to lack of funds, lack of local knowledge or misaligned incentives”).
52 Id. at 2.
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1. Increasing Inaction Costs
In order to successfully promote the return of well-suited and moder-
ately suited structures to productive use, it is necessary to put pressure on
owners to retenant property before it becomes a burden on the community.
In the midst of the housing foreclosure crisis, communities searched for a
way to monitor abandoned and foreclosed residences.53  Well over one thou-
sand municipalities have instituted vacant property registration (VPR) ordi-
nances,54 which have proven to be extremely effective in dealing with vacant
residential property.  Their widespread and relatively uncontroversial appli-
cation makes them an easily implemented fix for struggling communities.
The specific features of vacant building ordinances vary widely.55  They gen-
erally require owners to register vacant properties and pay a registration fee
within a certain time period after the building becomes “vacant.”56  In many
municipalities, the fee is charged annually, often with escalating fee sched-
ules based on the length of the vacancy period.57  The VPR ordinances also
require owners to submit “a detailed plan and timeline for reoccupying,
rehabbing or demolishing the building.”58  Only a few key elements, already
present in many such ordinances, are necessary for VPR ordinances to reach
the ghostbox problem.
Most critically, the scope of a VPR ordinance must be broad enough to
capture all retail property vacancies.  The ordinance should be drafted or
amended to explicitly apply to commercial properties.59  Some jurisdictions
have chosen to draft property ordinances that cover both residential and
53 See BUS. & PROF’L PEOPLE FOR THE PUB. INTEREST ET AL., HOW CAN MUNICIPALITIES
CONFRONT THE VACANT PROPERTY CHALLENGE?: A TOOLKIT 2 (2010).
54 See Vacant Property Registration, SAFEGUARD PROPS., https://safeguardproperties.com/
vacant-property-registration/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2018).
55 See id. Compare NEW CASTLE, DEL., CITY CODE § 141-19 (2018) ($0 registration fee
for first year, annual escalating fee schedule beginning at $500 thereafter), COOPER CITY,
FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 13-94 (2019) ($50 annual registration fee), ORMOND BEACH,
FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 14-74.04 (2018) ($250 annual registration fee), and HARRI-
SONVILLE, MO., MUNICIPAL CODE § 500.370 (2019) (no registration fee), with VACANT PROP-
ERTY REGISTRATION APPLICATION, CITY OF ST. CLOUD, MINN., HEALTH & INSPECTIONS DEP’T,
https://www.ci.stcloud.mn.us/DocumentCenter/View/10950/Vacant-Property-Registra-
tion-Application (last updated Oct. 2016) ($2000 annually).
56 See, e.g., BUS. & PROF’L PEOPLE FOR THE PUB. INTEREST & METRO. MAYORS CAUCUS,
VACANT BUILDING ORDINANCES: STRATEGIES FOR CONFRONTING VACANT BUILDING CHAL-
LENGES 4 (2016) [hereinafter VACANT BUILDING ORDINANCE STRATEGIES].
57 See Benton C. Martin, Vacant Property Registration Ordinances, 39 REAL EST. L.J. 6, 17
(2010).
58 BUS. & PROF’L PEOPLE FOR THE PUB. INTEREST ET AL., HOW CAN MUNICIPALITIES CON-
FRONT THE VACANT PROPERTY CHALLENGE?: AN APPENDIX TO THE TOOLKIT 26 (2010) [here-
inafter HOW CAN MUNICIPALITIES APPENDIX] (endorsing vacant property plan requirement
as a “valuable . . . tool for the municipal staff to engage with motivated property owners
and help them think concretely and realistically about appropriate steps that need to be
taken to identify and address problems with their properties”).
59 See Samantha N. Palma & Jason M. Santarcangelo, Note, Rehabilitating New Jersey’s
Abandoned Property Legislation, 41 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 361, 383 (2017).
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commercial properties;60 others have enacted separate ordinances covering
only vacant commercial property.61
A well-tailored VPR ordinance will define vacancy “based solely on how
long the property has been vacant or unoccupied”62 because ghostboxes’ del-
eterious effects are largely attributable to a lack of productive occupation.
Under some existing VPR ordinances, referred to as “Chula Vista model”
ordinances, foreclosure proceedings, rather than vacancy alone, trigger the
registration requirement.63  This model, which was popular as a response to
the housing foreclosure crisis, fails to capture properties that are vacant for
reasons other than foreclosure.  Other ordinances do not apply to unoccu-
pied buildings unless at least one additional enumerated issue is present.64
The departure of the occupant alone should trigger registration require-
ments.  In a residential context, commonly included triggering factors are
warning signs of potential impending externalities; when the same issues are
present in a retail context, the damage is already done.  For example, the
VPR ordinance of Ashtabula, Ohio, requires that owners register properties
that are unoccupied and unsecured, secured by other than normal means,
illegally occupied, or that have building code violations.65  These warning
signs are relatively benign in a residential context: one can easily imagine
most of these issues cropping up when an elderly owner experiences a medi-
cal emergency requiring an extended hospital stay and does not have the
chance to put up plywood or fix the front porch railing.66  Illegal occupation
also does not necessarily mean that a home has been taken over by squat-
ters—in many unfortunate cases, the “illegal occupant” is an owner whose
mortgage was foreclosed.67  On the other hand, securing a big box store is
relatively straightforward, and the simple, standardized, no-frills design signif-
icantly limits the opportunity for building code violations.  Because vacant
retail shells are, by their nature, nonresidential, illegal occupants are always a
sign of severe deterioration.  A VPR ordinance that requires triggering events
in addition to vacancy would fail to capture many vacant retail properties:
these buildings can remain empty for years without being foreclosed on or
becoming uninhabitable.68
60 E.g., CALEXICO, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 8.50 (2018).
61 E.g., CANTON, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9-1207 (2017).
62 VACANT BUILDING ORDINANCE STRATEGIES, supra note 56, at 7.
63 Timothy A. Davis, Note, A Comparative Analysis of State and Local Government Vacant
Property Registration Statutes, 44 URB. LAW. 399, 410 (2012).
64 See HOW CAN MUNICIPALITIES APPENDIX, supra note 58, at 15–16.
65 Ashtabula, Ohio, Ordinance No. 2013-44 (Mar. 18, 2013).
66 Compare supra Section I.A (discussing negative externalities caused by retail property
vacancies), with Kelly, Refreshing the Heart, supra note 24, at 214–15 (discussing how absen-
tee owners’ failure to maintain urban residential property contributes to neighborhood
decline).
67 See Amy Loftsgordon, Foreclosure Timeline: Getting Notice to Leave, NOLO, https://www
.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/free-books/foreclosure-book/chapter9-5.html (last visited
Feb. 2, 2018).
68 See HOW CAN MUNICIPALITIES APPENDIX, supra note 58, at 15–16.
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Municipalities should strongly consider utilizing an escalating fee struc-
ture in order to tailor the ordinance to address long-term vacancies.69  Low
initial fees will fund the registration system without interfering with short-
term vacancy which, unlike long-term vacancy,70 “is a normal and healthy
part of the real estate cycle.”71  Escalating fees will account for the increased
burdens that continuing vacancies place on the community’s resources and
will have the additional benefit of tailoring inactivity costs to the value the
owner—or the vacating tenant who continues to pay rent—places on leaving
the building unoccupied.72
When determining the appropriate amount of the registration fee, it is
imperative that municipalities set a fee that is sufficiently high to get corpo-
rate owners’ attention.73  Many ordinances require payment of fees tailored
to induce owners of vacant residential property to maintain the homes;74
increasing fees across the board would interfere with enforcement with
respect to these owners.75  To put the issue in concrete terms, the $500
annual fee that would induce the landlord-owner of a one-story bungalow to
find a new tenant is likely an inconsequential sum to a multibillion-dollar big
box retailer.  One solution would be to enact separate fee schedules for com-
69 U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., supra note 17, at 8 (“Fees that escalate the longer
a property remains vacant can create a disincentive for owners to mothball properties,
encouraging them to return these properties to productive use; in addition, revenue from
these fees offsets the costs associated with vacant properties.”).  For example, Charlotte
County, Florida, imposes the following registration fee schedule:
$150 for first-year registration;
$250 for buildings that have been vacant for two years;
$500 for buildings that have been vacant for three years;
$1000 for buildings that have been vacant for four years;
$2000 for buildings that have been vacant for five years; and
$4000 for buildings that have been vacant for six or more years.
CHARLOTTE COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF LAWS AND ORDINANCES § 3-2-115(g) (2018).
70 See supra Section I.A for a discussion of the high burden that long-term vacancies
impose on communities.
71 David T. Kraut, Note, Hanging Out the No Vacancy Sign: Eliminating the Blight of Vacant
Buildings from Urban Areas, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1139, 1140 n.4 (1999) (“Short-term vacancy is
a normal and healthy part of the real estate cycle, providing opportunities for residents
and business owners to find units whose net utility gain is greater than their current
unit.”).
72 See HOW CAN MUNICIPALITIES APPENDIX, supra note 58, at 17.
73 Admittedly, there is a trade-off, at least in the residential context, between setting
low fees to encourage maximum participation in the registration program and setting fees
high enough to motivate owners to maintain their vacant properties. See VACANT BUILDING
ORDINANCE STRATEGIES, supra note 56, at 9–11.  The same concern does not extend to
vacant retail properties because the low information costs to municipalities of discerning
whether a property is occupied and locating the owner decrease the need for voluntary
compliance.
74 See Martin, supra note 57, at 6, 13 n.44 (noting that the housing foreclosure crisis
prompted many municipalities to enact vacant property registration ordinances).
75 See VACANT BUILDING ORDINANCE STRATEGIES, supra note 56, at 9–11.
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mercial and residential property.76  Although this would address the problem
directly and carry low administrative costs, the solution is not necessarily well
tailored to inducing owners to find occupants for properties without impos-
ing so high a burden that the fee becomes uncollectable as to smaller retail-
ers.  Under this scheme, for example, the owner of a vacant mom-and-pop
hardware store would pay the same amount as the owner of a big box store
formerly occupied by Home Depot.  Because registration fees need to be jus-
tified by the cost of administering the program, it would be inappropriate to
charge a registration fee based on the owner’s financial situations.77
A solution that would better match owners’ ability to pay—and thus
decrease the chance that the fees would interfere with their ability to main-
tain and retenant the property—is achievable through the imposition of dif-
ferentiated inspection fees.  “Some municipalities place the burden of
property inspection on the registrant.”78  A community with sufficient per-
sonnel, however, should strongly consider drafting an ordinance that
requires owners to allow the municipality to conduct periodic inspections for
code compliance, and charge both the inspection and registration fee at the
time of registration or renewal.  This will this make it easier for the munici-
pality to “ensure compliance with safety and maintenance requirements.”79
It will also justify the collection of fees consistent with owners’ likely financial
resources: it is not uncommon for inspection fees to be calculated based on
the square footage of the building.80  For example, under such an arrange-
ment where the registration fee was set to $0.20 per square foot, the owner of
a 2400-square-foot single-family home81 would pay $480, while the owner of a
10,000-square-foot big box store would pay $2000.
One potential pitfall that municipalities may encounter is that it may not
be within the municipality’s power to institute a vacant property registration
fee.  The extent of municipalities’ powers covers the spectrum from low levels
of autonomy (Dillon’s Rule municipalities) to high levels of autonomy
76 See, e.g., Vacant Property Registration and Inspection, CHARTER TOWNSHIP WEST BLOOM-
FIELD, MICH., http://www.wbtownship.org/government/departments/building_and_zon
ing/vacant_property_registration_and_inspection_program.php (last visited Nov. 25,
2018) (indicating vacant property registration/inspection fees of $425 for residential
properties and $625 for commercial properties).  A municipality would be justified in
imposing different fees on residential and commercial properties because vacant commer-
cial properties impose a disproportionately high burden on municipal resources. See U.S.
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., supra note 17, at 7 (“Although commercial properties make
up only 3 percent of Oklahoma City’s vacancies, they account for approximately 40 percent
of all police and fire calls.”).
77 See VACANT BUILDING ORDINANCE STRATEGIES, supra note 56, at 10.
78 HOW CAN MUNICIPALITIES APPENDIX, supra note 58, at 24.
79 Id.
80 See, e.g., Inspection Fees, MUSKOGEE, OKLA., www.muskogeeonline.org/departments/
planning/inspection_fees.php (last visited Nov. 25, 2018).
81 The median size of a new home constructed in 2017 was 2426 square feet.  U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, MEDIAN AND AVERAGE SQUARE FEET OF FLOOR AREA IN NEW SINGLE-FAMILY
HOUSES COMPLETED (2017), https://www.census.gov/construction/chars/pdf/squarefeet.
pdf.
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(home rule municipalities).82  Even within a single state, the autonomy
granted to local governments may not be uniform.83  To further complicate
matters, a local government’s authority to require payment also depends on
whether the exaction is in the nature of a fee, a tax, a special assessment, or
some hybrid form.84  In the rare cases challenging the propriety of VPR fees,
courts have come to different conclusions—or have been unable to reach a
conclusion altogether—as to whether the fees represent taxes, special assess-
ments, or regulatory fees.85  There is little doubt, luckily, that municipalities
are almost universally empowered to impose reasonable building inspection
requirements.86  It is further generally accepted that the power to require
inspection also authorizes municipalities to set reasonable fees for building
inspections.87  Although it is foolish to hang one’s hat on broad generaliza-
tions as to the extent of municipal power, it is likely that a municipality that
may otherwise lack authority to impose VPR fees could still impose a building
inspection requirement and attach a reasonable inspection fee.
Some may argue that vacant property registration fees are an unneces-
sary administrative burden on the municipality because existing property
taxes are sufficient to induce owners to put their land to productive use.  This
is not the case.  It is true that an owner in financial distress may be unable to
afford to pay property taxes if property is not put to productive use; however,
a significant portion of vacant retail property owners do not need the prop-
82 See 1 SANDRA M. STEVENSON, ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 21.01 (2d ed.
2018).
83 See id.
84 In a Dillon’s Rule municipality, an express grant of power from the state legislature
is a prerequisite for any kind of exaction.  See id.  In a home rule municipality, the extent of
the power to institute taxes, fees, and special assessments varies broadly. See 4 STEVENSON,
supra note 82, § 64.01 (“There are a few cases which have acknowledged local government
power to tax without an express constitutional, statutory or charter grant, but the over-
whelming weight of authority is to the effect that local governments do not have an inher-
ent power of taxation.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)); id. § 65.02 (“Local
governments have no inherent power to levy special assessments. . . . Local authority to
impose special assessments is regularly conferred by statutes and charters.  Authority is also
derived from home-rule constitutional provisions giving local governments all power over
local concerns. . . . The general rule is that grants of power to local governments to impose
special assessments must be strictly construed and reasonable doubt as to the extent or
limitation of such authority is resolved against the locality.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote
omitted)); cf. 2 id. § 27.12 (“[L]icense and permit fees will be sustained if they reasonably
cover the regulatory expenses incurred by the local government and are not grossly or
consistently disproportionate thereto.” (emphasis omitted)).
85 Compare Meldahl v. City of Minneapolis, No. A13-0275, 2013 WL 6152196, at *6
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2013) (fee), with Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. City of Chicago, 962 F.
Supp. 2d 1044, 1063 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (tax), and City of Wilmington v. McDermott, No. 08T-
02-057, 2008 WL 4147580, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 2008) (finding, but not deciding
whether, vacant property fees are taxes or special assessments).
86 7A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24:556, Westlaw
(database updated July 2018).
87 Id.; cf. 2 STEVENSON, supra note 82, § 27.12.
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erty to turn a profit in order to cover property taxes.88  This is particularly
true in the case of otherwise profitable corporate owners, who can reduce
their taxable incomes by claiming a deduction for property taxes on their
federal income tax returns.89  In light of the widespread problem of underas-
sessed retail properties, municipalities with the time and resources to do so
may consider a large-scale reassessment to make sure that retail owners are
actually paying their fair share.
At various points in this nation’s history, scholars have suggested that
municipalities adopt a site value taxation method.  Unlike traditional prop-
erty taxes, which are based on the value of improvements, a site value (or
land value) tax taxes land at a higher rate than improvements in order to
create an incentive for owners to put land to productive use.90  Despite its
occasional popularity, the land value tax has never caught on in this country
and is barred by uniformity clauses contained in many state constitutions.91
The system is notoriously difficult to implement—a deal breaker for under-
resourced communities—and there is no guarantee that it would induce
owners to put their properties to productive use.92  Even if land value taxa-
tion is permitted under a state’s constitution, it is not the answer to munici-
palities’ vacant retail store problem.
88 See, e.g., Kraut, supra note 71, at 1152–53 (describing behavior of inner-city specula-
tors who take advantage of low property-tax burdens on vacant buildings while avoiding
the expense of dealing with tenants); Philip Mattera, Rolling Back Property Tax Payments:
How Wal-Mart Short-Changes Schools and Other Public Services by Challenging Its Property Assess-
ments, CORP. RES. PROJECT (Sept.–Oct. 2007), https://www.corp-research.org/e-letter/roll-
ing-back-property-tax-payments (describing “a large-scale effort to roll back its assessments,
lower its tax payments and thereby increase its after-tax profits”); Melanie Moul, ‘Dark Store’
Tax Loophole Hits Small-Town Budgets, HARDWARE RETAILING (Sept. 29, 2017), http://www
.hardwareretailing.com/dark-store-tax-loophole-hits-small-town-budgets/ (describing loop-
holes that allow big box stores, even when occupied, to be assessed as if they were vacant).
89 I.R.C. § 164(a)(1) (2012).
90 See generally Charles E. Harris, Note, Site Value Taxation: Economic Incentives and Land
Use Planning, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 115 (1971).
91 See Donald G. Hagman, The Single Tax and Land-Use Planning: Henry George Updated,
12 UCLA L. REV. 762, 767–73 (1965).
92 See, e.g., Charles, supra note 49 (“[T]he use of [such] taxes on vacant property [is]
‘a blunt instrument’ in spurring development.  Real estate markets are contextual.”); id.
(“In a hot market, the landlord might wait for a high-end renter.  If the market is soft, the
vacant land tax might force the landowner to allow it to fall into disrepair.”); Elaine S.
Povich, Can Extra Taxes on Vacant Land Cure City Blight?, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Mar. 7,
2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/03/07/
can-extra-taxes-on-vacant-land-cure-city-blight (“Critics argue that the taxes are helpful in a
city where land values are increasing . . . but not so much in cities where values are
stagnant . . . .”).
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2. Lowering Transaction Costs
When the property in question is clearly marketable,93 difficulty locating
a tenant usually indicates that the total cost of purchasing or leasing the
property exceeds its value to potential tenants.  In the real world, the cost of
occupying a new store includes more than just the proposed rental or selling
price.  Unlike the frictionless transactions represented in the matrix above,
the cost of retenanting also includes the cost of negotiating a new lease and
renovating or, even in the case of retail reuse, making cosmetic changes to
the existing structure.  Local governments can decrease the total cost to new
tenants—and thereby increase the pool of potential tenants—by taking steps
to remove obstacles to profitable occupation.
Frequently, obstacles to retenanting retail property are the result of pre-
vious tenants’ deliberate actions taken to prevent competitors from entering
the market.94  Many retail chains engage in an explicit policy of continuing
to pay rent for an old location after moving into a new store in the same
town.95  Others ensure the same effect by negotiating for the inclusion of
noncompete lease provisions in the original lease.96  Walmart’s leases, for
example, often include a clause that specifically prohibits the building owner
from re-leasing the property to a Kmart or Target after Walmart has ceased
occupation of the building.97  When Walmart sells stores that it owns, the
company places even broader restrictions on leasing to competitors, requir-
ing purchasers “to sign a letter of intent that prohibits the property from
being used as a large discount store, warehouse membership club, grocery
store, pharmacy, large bowling alley, movie theatre, or health spa in the
future.”98
Peachtree City, Georgia, is one of a handful of municipalities that has
taken an ex ante approach to the problem by enacting ordinances that pro-
hibit the inclusion of such clauses in commercial property leases.99  Although
such ordinances effectively prevent situations in which the vacating tenant
93 Marketability is captured by the well-suited and moderately suited designations.
Keep in mind that the diagnosed highest-value use of a parcel—and, therefore, the
existing structure’s suitability to that use—accounts for the community’s ability to support
that use. See supra Section II.A.
94 See, e.g., Cherwin & Harding, supra note 39, at 39; Peak, supra note 12.
95 Schindler, supra note 5, at 488 n.67.
96 Id. at 502.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 508.
99 PEACHTREE CITY, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES app. A, art. X, § 1006.3(a)(6) (2018).
Peachtree City’s ordinance makes the operation of a retail business occupying more than
10,000 square feet a conditional use within the general commercial district. Id.  One con-
dition is that the tenant engaged in such business demonstrate that the rental agreement
contains a contract provision prohibiting such person or entity from voluntarily
vacating such premises or otherwise ceasing to conduct its retail business on such
premises while simultaneously preventing the landlord, by continuing to pay rent or
otherwise, from leasing the premises to another person or company who will operate a
permitted business on the premises.
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bars the property owner from retenanting the property—and should cer-
tainly be enacted by municipalities in advance of retenanting existing
greyfields—it is not clear that the provision would be effective with regard to
existing leases.100
It is often more expensive for a new tenant to take over an existing struc-
ture in an area where land is cheap than it is to build a new store in the same
community.101  Even straight retail reuse of a structure moderately suited to
the new tenant’s purposes requires renovations to match the existing struc-
ture to the store’s concept, particularly when the incoming tenant is part of a
retail chain that relies on uniform store design as a central aspect of its
branding.102  To decrease the cost of reuse to prospective tenants, municipal-
ities must take steps to ensure that reusing an existing structure is more cost-
effective than building a new store.
“If a prospective re-user wants to make drastic exterior modifications and
structural alterations [to the existing structure], it is possible that new site
requirements will be triggered, such as setback or open space requirements
that were not yet in place when the original structure was built.”103  In order
to make adaptive reuse, as well as retail reuse of moderately suitable struc-
tures, attractive to new tenants, municipalities must lower barriers to
modification.
Structures are required to comply with the building code in effect when
they were originally constructed.  If an owner or tenant wishes to make signif-
icant changes later on, all requirements for new construction currently in
effect must be met.104  One method that is particularly well matched to
encouraging reuse of moderately suitable structures is to adopt the Interna-
tional Existing Building Code (IEBC).105  The purpose of the IEBC is to pro-
Id. (emphasis added).  The ordinance also provides that any such restriction is ineffective.
Id.
100 Courts have not yet addressed this issue. Compare Schindler, supra note 5, at 532
(suggesting that “an ordinance that voids such existing non-compete clauses in the leases
of big box retail tenants or prohibits them from including such provisions if they are to
renew their leases” would constitute a constitutional exercise of the municipality’s police
power), with S. Hamilton Assocs. v. Morristown, 493 A.2d 523 (N.J. 1985) (invalidating
retroactive application of rent control ordinance to existing leases on grounds of impair-
ment of contract, but stating that such ordinance could apply retroactively in the case of a
housing emergency).
101 See Patricia E. Salkin, Municipal Regulation of Formula Businesses: Creating and Protect-
ing Communities, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1251, 1256 (2008).
102 Farr, supra note 6 (“[M]ost retailers have a store prototype that is unique.  There-
fore they reject existing vacant space because it does not meet their store format require-
ments. . . . Retailers often prefer building on vacant land instead of incurring the cost to
rehabilitate existing space.”).
103 Schindler, supra note 5, at 507–08.
104 See MCQUILLIN, supra note 86, § 24:502.
105 Effective Use of the International Existing Building Code, INT’L CODE COUNCIL (Aug.
2017), https://codes.iccsafe.org/content/IEBC2018/EFFECTIVE-USE-OF-THE-INTER
NATIONAL-EXISTING-BUILDING-CODE?site_type=public/.
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mote the reuse of existing structures.106  In order to balance this objective
with public safety concerns, the code “allows for options for controlled depar-
ture from full compliance with the International Codes dealing with new con-
struction, while maintaining basic levels for fire prevention, structural and
life safety features of the rehabilitated building.”107  Adopting the IEBC will
reduce the cost of modifications by eliminating the requirement that the
structure, as modified, comply with provisions that are not necessary for pub-
lic safety.108  This is a particularly attractive, low-cost method for under-
resourced communities because the IEBC is designed to work seamlessly with
the International Building Code, which is administered at the state or local
level in all fifty states.109
Another established method for encouraging adaptive reuse is for local
zoning authorities to encourage innovative use through the granting of vari-
ances.110  Time spent negotiating with local governments over land use
changes represents a significant transaction cost for new tenants.111  Local
government actors should keep the objective of encouraging reuse of
existing structures in mind throughout negotiations with potential tenants.
Offering tax incentives to prospective developers and businesses has
become the norm for municipalities competing to attract economic invest-
ment.112  Public servants should be careful—even hesitant—when consider-
ing this option.  Retailers benefit from local resources as much as, if not
more than, other residents.113  As already discussed, retailers frequently com-
pound these incentives by taking advantage of commerce-friendly property
tax provisions once they arrive.114  There is a fine line between negotiating
for a mutually beneficial arrangement and allowing incoming businesses to
become freeloaders.
The longer a building remains vacant, the greater the likely capital
expenditure necessary for owners to complete necessary modifications and




109 United States Usage of the I-Codes, INT’L CODE COUNCIL, https://www.iccsafe.org/
about-icc/overview/international-code-adoptions/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).
110 See SICOLA & STAPP, supra note 36, at 2.
111 See id. (“A major issue in [renovation and reuse] is securing local jurisdictional
approval of land-use changes, needed variances or redesign” and advising developers to
allow “[a]mple time . . . for discussions and negotiations around changing regulations.”).
112 See, e.g., Jonelle Marte, 10 Things Shopping Malls Won’t Tell You, MARKETWATCH (June
26, 2011), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/10-things-shopping-malls-wont-tell-you-
1308954251095 (discussing perks offered by municipalities hoping to attract new retailers);
Peter H. Milliken, City Markets Vacant Grocery Store, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR (Dec. 22,
2015), http://www.vindy.com/news/2015/dec/22/city-hungers-for-buyer-to-take-over-
vaca/ (discussing probable expectations of prospective incoming businesses).
113 See Farr, supra note 6; Patricia E. Salkin, Supersizing Small Town America: Using Region-
alism to Right-Size Big Box Retail, 6 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 48, 52 (2005); Schindler, supra note 5, at
521.
114 See supra subsection II.B.1.
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funding by waiving fees for those who are in the process of demolishing,
rehabilitating, retenanting, or substantially repairing their buildings.115  This
waiver will stand in for the subsidy that developers have come to expect from
local governments in weaker markets, effectively increasing funds available to
rehabilitate the property without requiring an expenditure of public funds.
This is particularly true if the waiver is partial: the city will continue to receive
funds necessary to maintain the registration system, and the discount reflects
an acknowledgment that ongoing work on the site will reduce the cost of
other aspects of administration, such as monitoring and securing the
property.
C. If You Won’t Do It, We’ll Do It for You: Unsuitable Structures
Another point of departure in the greyfield context from accepted
approaches to urban residential vacancies is the attractiveness of government
intervention.  During the Great Recession, cities like Detroit, Cleveland, and
Baltimore made national headlines when widespread foreclosure and neglect
by absentee property speculators produced entire city blocks of blighted
vacant property.116  In those areas, comparatively high potential property val-
ues and the effect of vacancy on close neighbors’ health, safety, and welfare
make swift intervention by government or community organizations desira-
ble and, often, profitable.  Nonurban communities plagued by greyfields,
however, do not have the time or money to intervene in any but the most
desperate of vacancies.117
The main methods by which local governments obtain control of vacant
properties have historically been nuisance abatement, tax foreclosure, vacant
building receivership, and eminent domain.118  Because an extensive body of
115 See HOW CAN MUNICIPALITIES APPENDIX, supra note 58, at 19 (providing examples of
municipalities that allow full or partial waiver or refund of registration or renewal fees to
encourage owners to repair, rehabilitate, demolish, sell, or lease the property); VACANT
BUILDING ORDINANCE STRATEGIES, supra note 56, at 11; Martin, supra note 57, at 15 n.51; see
also Benson v. City of Portland, 850 P.2d 416, 418 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that ordi-
nance providing for waiver of registration fee conditioned on demolition or reoccupation
does not constitute a taking).
116 See, e.g., Kelly, A Continuum in Remedies, supra note 24; Kate Abbey-Lambertz, Watch
Detroit Neighborhoods Fall into Ruin Through Google Street View Images, HUFFINGTON POST
(March 26, 2016, 8:03 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/google-street-view-
detroit-abandoned-homes-foreclosure_us_56f41be3e4b0c3ef52183d4b; Leila Atassi, Cleve-
land’s Glut of Vacant Housing Could Cost Billions to Eliminate at Current Pace, CLEVELAND.COM
(Sept. 25, 2012), https://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2012/09/cleve-
lands_glut_of_vacant_hous.html.
117 See Kraut, supra note 71, at 1140–41 (noting that while cities have the power to seize
abandoned property from owners for just compensation, doing so can be prohibitively
expensive).
118 See id.; Creola Johnson, Fight Blight: Cities Sue to Hold Lenders Responsible for the Rise in
Foreclosures and Abandoned Properties, 3 UTAH L. REV. 1169 (2008).
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literature on this topic already exists,119 my purpose here is to briefly summa-
rize their applicability to ghostbox remediation.  In practice, these solutions
are only effective against truly unsuitable vacant retail properties.
Tax foreclosure, a “promising method of redistribution” of underutil-
ized property,120 is only available if the owner fails to keep the property taxes
current.121  This solution is particularly unlikely to be available when the
property owner is holding out for a higher rental or sale price.122  In those
cases, the stores’ taxes are often too low to be burdensome.123  It is also
unlikely that the owner of a property for which a vacating tenant continues to
pay rent will allow the taxes to go unpaid.
Traditional code enforcement and its in rem counterpart, receivership,
are possible solutions for an unsuitable structure that is so blighted that reha-
bilitation is impossible or not worth the investment.124  Hopefully, the tech-
niques discussed in Sections II.A and II.B will prevent the vast majority of
properties from reaching this point of no return.  These avenues are availa-
ble only if the building has fallen into a state of relatively severe disrepair.
State and local law, usually based on the International Building Code safety
standards, authorizes municipal enforcement actions against vacant property
nuisances.  Indiana’s building code, for example, “tracks, more or less, the
IBC definition,” but extends “the concept of an unsafe building” to “any
vacant property not fit to be lived in to an order to repair immediately or
even demolish the structure.”125  Statutes such as this were clearly drafted
with vacant residential properties in mind, and do little to address the prob-
lem of vacant commercial properties.  Furthermore, such statutes often rely
on traditional nuisance concepts, which are inapplicable when a ghostbox’s
nearest neighbor is a quarter of a mile away.126
Exercising the power of eminent domain, while certainly effective,
should always be considered a last resort.  As a practical matter, the tactic is
119 See generally John Accordino & Gary T. Johnson, Addressing the Vacant and Abandoned
Property Problem, 22 J. URB. AFF. 301 (2000); Kelly, A Continuum in Remedies, supra note 24;
Kelly, Refreshing the Heart, supra note 24; Bell, supra note 24; Kraut, supra note 71.
120 Kelly, Refreshing the Heart, supra note 24, at 215.
121 See id.
122 Cf. id. (noting that financially savvy owners of urban residential properties may con-
tinue to pay property taxes on vacant properties if they believe that the property may
appreciate in value at some uncertain future date).
123 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
124 See Kelly, Refreshing the Heart, supra note 24, at 211.
125 Kelly, A Continuum in Remedies, supra note 24, at 115–16 (citing IND. CODE § 36-7-9-
4(a)(6) (2005)).
126 See id. at 116 (citing IND. CODE § 36-7-9-5(a) (2013)) (“The statute, however,
requires that any ordered action ‘be reasonably related to the condition of the unsafe
premises and the nature and use of nearby properties.’  Thus, an order to repair must
focus on those deficiencies that either make a property a danger or make it unfit for occu-
pancy and cannot extend to preventative maintenance.  Likewise, a demolition order must
be justified by the building’s severely deteriorated condition and its lack of prospects for
prompt renovation.” (footnotes omitted)).
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best “invoked to facilitate massive redevelopment”127—an unlikely scenario
for shrinking and struggling areas with plenty of untouched land.  Such areas
are also unlikely to have the financial ability to exercise eminent domain.
The Constitution requires that the government pay just compensation to the
owner of property taken for public use.128  The fair market value of a retail
shell may or may not be fairly low.  “Of course, even at bargain prices, in this
economy, many municipalities are unable to purchase anything.”129  As a
political matter, any government considering the use of eminent domain
should proceed with extreme caution.130  In light of the public backlash
against the Kelo v. City of New London131 decision, it ought to be clear that
citizens are tremendously uncomfortable with the idea of their government
taking private property for redevelopment, no matter how economically ben-
eficial the move may turn out to be.132  An injudicious attempt to utilize this
approach could alarm potential developers and cause more severe economic
disinvestment than the retail vacancy itself.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the retail industry is undergoing a period of
transformation.  Technological advances and changing consumer values have
prompted a shift away from the expansion-based model of the past.  As was
the case during the housing foreclosure crisis, local governments will be
called upon by their communities to respond to the problems that result
from the retail apocalypse.  This Note encourages municipalities to evaluate
their current ability to prevent retail shells from becoming a drain on the
community.  For those localities already burdened by long-vacant ghostboxes,
this Note provides a clear starting point from which to attack a daunting
economic challenge.  Above all, local governments ought to use the forego-
ing methods as a baseline, exercising creativity in finding solutions tailored
to the needs of those they serve.
127 Id. at 111.
128 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
129 Schindler, supra note 5, at 538 n.303.
130 See Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 539.
131 545 U.S. 469, 485, 490 (2005) (finding that the city’s disposition of property for
economic development qualified as public use within the meaning of the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment).
132 See Schindler, supra note 5, at 538.
